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 CORPORATE LIABILITY, GOVERNMENT LIABILITY, 
AND THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER 
Eri Osaka† 
Abstract: This article focuses on the liability issues arising from the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster.  The radioactivity released from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 
Plant inflicted catastrophic harm to people, industries, and the environment.  Under 
Japanese law, a nuclear operator bears strict, channeling, and unlimited liability for 
nuclear damage unless the damage is caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character.  This article concludes the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami that 
triggered this nuclear accident do not fall within this exemption because neither of them 
were unforeseeable nor far beyond the design basis for the reactors at the plant.  
Therefore, Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”) must compensate any damages if 
the nuclear accident is the legally sufficient cause of them.  Additionally, this article 
argues two entities should be legally responsible for the Fukushima nuclear disaster.  The 
Government of Japan can be liable for the nuclear damage if it failed to exercise its 
regulatory power over the Tokyo Electric Power Company or if its errant acts expanded 
the damage.  General Electric, the designer of the reactors at the plant, might also be 
liable for the nuclear damage under U.S. law, assuming the reactors had any weaknesses 
in their design. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
On March 11, 2011 at 2:46 p.m. JST (5:46 a.m. UTC), a 9.0 
magnitude earthquake hit northeastern Japan.  The earthquake and resulting 
tsunami caused the blackout of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant 
(“Plant”).  Without any cooling measures, the Plant experienced hydrogen 
explosions and a meltdown, releasing radiation into the environment.  As a 
“Major Accident” on the International Nuclear Event Scale, this accident 
was rated at level seven, the same level as the Chernobyl disaster.1  People 
living in the vicinity of the plant were evacuated by government order 
voluntarily.  Agriculture, fishing, tourism, and other businesses have been 
affected substantially by this catastrophic event. 
Since then, Tokyo Electric Power Company (“TEPCO”), the operator 
of the plant, has drawn heavy criticism from around the world.  However, is 
TEPCO the only one to blame?  Is it possible the Japanese government, 
which failed to exercise its regulatory power over TEPCO, or General 
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1
 Press Release, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, INES Rating on the Events in 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station by the Tohoku District—off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake 
(Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110412-4.pdf. 
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Electric Company (“GE”), the designer of the Mark I reactor that failed at 
the Plant, will be held legally liable for this devastating outcome?  
This article is divided into four parts.  Part II presents a brief overview 
of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage.  Part III provides a 
description of the compensation scheme for the Fukushima nuclear disaster.  
Part IV discusses why TEPCO cannot escape from its liability despite the 
provision in section 3, paragraph 1 of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage.  Part V considers the potential liability of the Japanese government 
and GE. 
II. ACT ON COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 
A. Purpose  
The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage2 (“the Compensation 
Act”) was enacted in 1961 with two purposes:  1) “to protect persons 
suffering from ‘nuclear damage,’” and 2) “to contribute to the sound 
development of the nuclear industry by establishing the basic system 
regarding compensation in case of nuclear damage caused by reactor 
operation.”3 
The term “nuclear damage” means “any damage caused by the effects 
of the fission process of nuclear fuel, by the radiation from nuclear fuel or 
material contaminated by nuclear fuel, or by the toxic nature of such 
materials.”4  However, this definition is too ambiguous to set the scope of 
damage to be compensated.  Courts have applied the general principle of 
“scope of damage” under section 416 of the Civil Code;5 that is, if “effects 
of the fission process of nuclear fuel, or of the radiation from nuclear fuel 
etc., or of the toxic nature of such materials” constitute a legally sufficient 
cause (“sōtō ingakankei”), victims of any damage caused by such effects 
may seek compensation from the offending nuclear operator.6  Section 2 
contains a provisory clause, “[a]ny damage suffered by the nuclear operator 
who is liable for such damage is excluded.”7 
                                                      
2
 Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [The Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961 (Japan), translation available at http://www.oecd-
nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf. 
3
  Id. art. 1.  
4
  Id. art. 2, para. 2. 
5
  MINPŌ [CIV. C.], Law No. 89 of 1896 (Japan). 
6
  See, e.g., Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Apr. 19, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) no. 6644, 1960 
HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 64 (Japan) (Kume Quality Products Ltd. v. JCO Ltd.); Mito Chihō Saibansho [Mito 
Dist. Ct.], Feb. 27, 2008, Hei 14 (wa) no. 513, 2003 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 67 (Japan) (commonly known as 
the JCO Critical Accident Health Injury Case). 
7
 The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2, art. 2. 
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B. Principles of Liability 
The Compensation Act provides for strict liability, 8  channeling 
liability,9 and unlimited liability10 for nuclear operators.  Under channeling 
liability, where reactor operations cause nuclear damage, only the nuclear 
operator is liable for the damage.11  In other words, no other person is liable 
for the damage in such case.12  Section 798, paragraph 1 of the Trade Act,13 
the Act Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Shipowners,14 and the 
Product Liability Act15 do not apply to nuclear damage that is caused as 
result of reactor operation.16  The court interpreted the Act on Compensation 
for Nuclear Damage to preclude a claim regarding a failure to perform 
obligations under contract 17  or a tort claim 18  under the Civil Code. 19  
However, where nuclear damage is caused by the willful act of a third party, 
the nuclear operator can make a claim for contribution against that third 
party.20  It should be noted that, in the United States, the liability of nuclear 
industry is limited under the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity 
Act (“Price-Anderson Act”).21 
C. Immunities 
The provision of section 3 of the Compensation Act exonerates a 
nuclear operator from liability where the damage is caused by a grave 
natural disaster of an exceptional character or an insurrection.22  When a 
                                                      
8
 Id. art. 3, para. 1. 
9
  Id. art. 4, para. 1. 
10
  Id. arts. 3, 4. 
11
  Id. art. 3, para. 1. 
12
  Id. art. 4, para. 1. 
13
  Shōhō [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899 (Japan). 
14
 Senpaku no Shoyūshato no Sekinin no Seigen ni kansuru Hōritsu [Law Limiting the Liability of 
Shipowners], Law No. 94 of 1975 (Japan). 
15
 Seizoubutsu Sekinin Hō [Product Liability Act], Law No. 85 of 1994.  
16
 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2, art. 4(3). 
17
 MINPŌ [CIV. C.], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 415 (Japan). 
18
 Id. art. 709.  
19
 See Mito Chihō Saibansho [Mito Dist. Ct.], Feb. 27, 2008, Hei 14 (wa) no. 513, 2003 HANREI JIHŌ 
[HANJI] 67 (Japan) (commonly known as the JCO Critical Accident Health Injury Case); see also Tōkyō 
Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.], May 14, 2009, Hei 20 (ne) no. 1395, 2066 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 54 
(Japan). 
20
 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2, art. 5(1). 
21
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e). 
22
 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2, art. 3(1).  In the United States, the 
coverage of indemnification agreement under the Price-Anderson Act excludes:  1) claims under State or 
Federal workmen's compensation acts of employees of persons indemnified who are employed at the site of 
and in connection with the activity where the nuclear incident occurs, 2) claims arising out of an act of war, 
and 3) claims for loss of property which is located at the site of and used in connection with the licensed 
activity where the nuclear incident occurs.  42 U.S.C § 2014(w). 
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nuclear operator is exonerated, the Compensation Act requires the Japanese 
government to take necessary measures to relieve victims and to prevent the 
damage from spreading.23 
D. Financial Security 
A nuclear operator is required to provide financial security for 
compensation resulting from nuclear damage.24  For this purpose, a nuclear 
operator must buy private and government insurance or make a deposit with 
the Legal Affairs Bureau.25 
Twenty nonlife and casualty insurance companies established the 
Japan Atomic Energy Insurance Pool (“Pool”) in 1960 to provide private 
insurance for nuclear damage.26  As of March 2010, twenty-four nonlife 
insurance companies, including foreign companies, have joined the Pool.27  
In order to diversify risk, the Pool is reinsured with other atomic energy 
insurance pools around the world.  All nuclear operators in Japan buy a 
policy through the Pool that insures up to 120 billion yen of nuclear 
damage. 28   However, the Pool does not cover some nuclear damages, 
including damage caused by an earthquake, volcanic eruption, or tsunami.29  
The Act on the Indemnity Agreement for Compensation of Nuclear 
Damage30 was enacted in 1961 to cover such damages.  The indemnity 
agreement for compensation for nuclear damage covers:  1) nuclear damage 
caused by an earthquake, volcanic eruption, or tsunami; 2) nuclear damage 
caused by normal operation; or 3) nuclear damage for which the persons 
suffering therefrom have not claimed compensation within a period of ten 
years from the day of the occurrence of the event.31  All of the nuclear 
                                                      
23
 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2 art. 17. 
24
 Id. art. 6. 
25
 Id. art. 7.  
26
  See THE GENERAL INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN (“GIAJ”), GENERAL INSURANCE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHERS, http://www.sonpo.or.jp/en/links/004.html; Gensan Kyōkai [Japan Atomic 
Industrial Forum], Anata ni Shitte Moraitai Genbai Seido [Nuclear Damage Compensation Scheme Which 
We Would Like Everyone to Know], http://www.jaif.or.jp/melmag_db/2010/0426.html#7. 
27
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
28
 Id.; Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni Kansuru Hōritsu Shikōrei [Enforcement Order of the Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage], Cabinet Order No.44 of 1962 (Japan), sec. 2. 
29
 See FAQ, MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/faq/1261356.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (question four 
asks, “What is the difference between private insurance for nuclear damage and indemnity agreement for 
compensation of nuclear damage?”). 
30
 Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hoshō Keiyaku ni kansuru Hōritsu [Act on Indemnity Agreements for 
Compensation of Nuclear Damage], Law No. 148 of 1961 (Japan), translation available at 
http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs/Japan-Nuclear%20Liability-Indemnification-Contract-
Law.pdf. 
31
 Id. art. 10. 
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operators entered into an indemnity agreement for nuclear damage 
compensation with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and 
Technology (“MEXT”) and pay indemnity fees every year. 32   After the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, TEPCO could not renew its insurance policy 
through the Pool.33  Before the expiration of its private insurance, TEPCO 
had deposited 120 billion yen to the Tokyo Legal Affairs Bureau as of 
January 13, 2012.34 
When nuclear damage exceeds the financial security amount provided 
by a nuclear operator, in this case 120 billion yen, the government gives the 
operator such aid as is required to compensate for the damage.35  Such aid is 
given to the extent that the National Diet authorizes the government to 
provide it.36 
E. Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute Reconciliation Committee  
The MEXT may establish a Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute 
Reconciliation Committee to oversee out of court settlements of any disputes 
that arise over the compensation of nuclear damage, and to prepare general 
instructions to help operators voluntarily settle such disputes.37 
F. Amendments 
The Compensation Act has a sunset clause on government insurance 
and government aid,38 and it has been amended to extend both measures 
almost every ten years. 39   The Compensation Act was most recently 
amended in 2009.40  The compensation scheme for nuclear damage under the 
Compensation Act was applied for the first time following the JCO 
                                                      
32
 Id. art. 8. 
33
 Genpatsu Hoken Mondai: Tōden 1,200-oku En Kyōtaku Shōnin [Nuclear Power Plant Insurance 
Problem: TEPCO’s deposit offer of 12 billion yen was accepted], TOKYO SHIMBUN (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/feature/nucerror/list/CK2012011302100010.html. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2, art. 16(1). 
36
 Id. art. 16(2). 
37
 Id. art. 18(1). 
38
 Id. art. 20. 
39
 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, MINISTRY HISTORY OF 
AMENDMENT OF THE ACT ON COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shi
ngi/chousa/kaihatu/007/shiryo/08061105/006.htm. 
40
 Genshiryoku Songai no Baishō ni kansuru Hōritsu oyobi Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Hoshō 
Keiyaku ni kansuru Hōritsu no ichibu wo Kaisei suru Hōritsu [Law Amending Part of the Law Relating to 
Nuclear Damage Compensation and the Law on Contracts for Nuclear Damage Compensation],  
Law No. 19 of 2009 (Japan). 
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Criticality Accident.41  The JCO Critically Accident occurred at a uranium 
reprocessing facility operated by JCO Ltd. in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki on 
September 30, 1999.42  Three JCO employees were exposed to high levels of 
neutron radiation, and two of them died.43  Additionally, at least 667 people 
were exposed to radiation.44 
This accident revealed major flaws in the Compensation Act.  First, 
the amount of financial security for the accident was one billion yen at that 
time. 45   Second, a huge number of compensation claims arose, and 
compensation negotiations between the JCO and victims became 
complicated.46  However, at that time the Compensation Act did not give the 
power to the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage 
Compensation47  to set compensation guidelines for victims. 48   Thus, the 
Science and Technology Agency established the Nuclear Damage 
Investigation Study Group exclusively for that purpose.  Most victims 
pursued their claims based on the criteria set by the Study Group.49  By 
May 13, 2010, 8,018 claims were filed, of which 6,983 were subject to 
compensation.50  The total amount of compensation reached 15.4 billion 
yen. 51   Because JCO’s financial security only covered one billion yen, 
Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. Ltd., the parent company of JCO, paid the 
remainder, based not on a legal liability but rather its moral responsibility.52  
                                                      
41
 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, REVIEW OF NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION SCHEME, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/007/shiryo/08061105/001.htm. 
42
 Shun-Ichi Tanaka, Summary of the JCO Criticality Accident in Tokai-mura and a Dose 
Assessment, J. RADIAT. RES., 42: SUPPL., S1-S9 (2001), available at http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jrr/4
2/SUPPL/S1/_pdf. 
43
 See MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, JCO RINKAI JIKO 
NI OKERU BAISHŌ NO GAIYŌ [SUMMARY OF THE JCO CRITICALLY ACCIDENT], available at http://www.me
xt.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/shiryo/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/04/20/1305111_5.pdf. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
47
 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
48
 At the time, art. 18, para. 2 of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage stated:  “The 
Reconciliation Committee shall:  1) mediate reconciliation of any dispute arising from compensation of 
nuclear damage, 2) investigate and assess nuclear damage as necessary for dealing with the matters 
mentioned above.”  See MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI BAISHŌ SEIDO NI KANSURU RONTEN SEIRI [ISSUES REGARDING THE NUCLEAR 
DAMAGE COMPENSATION SCHEME], http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/007/shiryo/0806
1105/005.htm. 
49
 NUCLEAR DAMAGE INVESTIGATION STUDY GROUP, FINAL REPORT OF NUCLEAR DAMAGE 
INVESTIGATION (Mar. 29, 2000), http://www.hiroi.iii.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index-genzai_no_sigoto-JCO_jiko-
songai-chosa.pdf. 
50
 See SUMMARY OF JCO CRITICALLY ACCIDENT, supra note 43. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
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Two petitions were filed to the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for 
Nuclear Damage Compensation and eleven cases went to court.53 
III. COMPENSATION SCHEME FOR FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER 
A. Interim Guidelines for Determination of the Scope of Nuclear 
Damage Due to TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni Nuclear 
Power Plants 
The Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage 
Compensation was established on April 11, 2011.54  It consists of experts 
from the legal, medical, and nuclear engineering fields.55  After thirteen 
deliberations, on August 5, 2011, the Committee published “Interim 
Guidelines for Determination of the Scope of Nuclear Damage Due to 
TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni Nuclear Power Plants.”56 
The Committee listed the following types of damage as eligible for 
compensation: 
1) Damage Caused by Governmental Instructions for Evacuation 
(including medical examination expenses, evacuation expenses, 
temporary expenses associated with returning home, homecoming 
expenses, life or bodily damage, mental suffering, business damage, 
lost income, examination expenses for property, and loss or 
diminishment of property value); 
2) Damage Caused by Governmental Designation of the 
Navigational Hazard Zone and No-Fly Zone (including business 
damage and lost income); 
3) Damage Caused by Governmental Instruction for Restriction on 
Shipment of Agricultural and Marine Products, etc. (including 
                                                      
53
 Id. 
54
 Cabinet Order Concerning the Establishment of Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear 
Damage Compensation, Cabinet Order No. 99 of 2012 (Japan). 
55
  See MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, LIST OF DISPUTE 
RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION MEMBERS, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/meibo/1309440.htm. 
56
 DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, TOKYO 
DENRYOKU KABUSHIKIGAISHA FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI, DAI-NI GENSHIRYOKU HATSUDENSHO JIKO NI YORU 
GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI NO HAN’I NO HANTEITŌ NI KANSURU CHŪKAN SHISHIN (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houkoku/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/08/17/13094
52_1_2.pdf.  The Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Plant was also impacted by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and tsunami.  Unlike Reactors 1 to 4 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, all four 
reactors of the Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Plant reached a cold shutdown by March 15, 2011. 
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business damage, lost income, and, examination expenses for 
property); 
4) Damage Caused by Other Governmental Instructions (including 
business damage, lost income, and examination expenses for 
property); 
5) Reputation Damage (including reputation damage suffered by 
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, or food business, reputation 
damage suffered by tourist business, reputation damage suffered by 
manufacturing business, and service business, etc., reputation damage 
pertaining to export); 
6) Indirect Damage (including business damage and lost income); 
7) Damage Caused by Radiation Exposure; and 
8) Property Damage to Local Governments.57 
The Nuclear Damage Dispute Reconciliation Committee states that, 
except for the damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and 
tsunami, any damages can be compensated if the nuclear accident is the 
legally sufficient cause of such damages. 58   If a person receives other 
compensatory benefits, however, the amount of compensation must be 
deducted by that amount.59 
The Nuclear Damage Dispute Reconciliation Committee confirms that 
these interim guidelines are intended to be comprehensive as of the date of 
publication.60  Therefore, damage not covered by these guidelines can be 
covered if the nuclear accident is the legally sufficient cause of such 
damage.  These guidelines can be reviewed in response to changing 
situations in the future.  Indeed, the Committee resumed its discussion over 
damage incurred by voluntary evacuation and cost of radioactive 
decontamination. 61   On December 6, 2011, the Committee published 
supplemental guidelines on the damage caused by voluntary evacuation, 
etc.62  This guideline treats voluntary evacuees and people remaining in the 
                                                      
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. at 3-5. 
59
 Id. at 58. 
60
 Id. at 2. 
61
 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HANDOUTS-
COMMITTEE MINUTES-SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS DAMAGES NUCLEAR DISPUTE, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_me
nu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/giji_list/index.htm. 
62
 DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, TOKYO 
DENRYOKU KABUSHIKIGAISHA FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI, DAI-NI GENSHIRYOKU HATSUDENSHO JIKO NI YORU 
GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI NO HAN’I NO HANTEITŌ NI KANSURU CHŪKAN SHISHIN TSUIHO: JISHU HINANTŌ NI 
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voluntary evacuation zone equally, because the latter have also feared 
radiation exposure.  Furthermore, on March 24, 2012, the Committee 
published second supplemental guidelines on the damage caused by 
governmental instructions for evacuation and voluntary evacuation.63  
B. TEPCO’s Response 
Though TEPCO offered temporary compensation payments to meet 
the immediate needs for some victims starting on April 26, 2011,64 it finally 
undertook its procedure to permanently compensate individual victims of the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant on September 12, 2011.65  It sent 
application packets for individuals to 60,000 homes that claimed temporary 
compensation payment. 66   Other individual victims have to request the 
packet through TEPCO’s call center.67  This packet covers damage incurred 
from March 11 to August 31, 201168 and included a 60-page application 
form and a 156-page manual.69  Victims originally had to fill out a total of 
2,215 sections and provide receipts and other evidentiary documents. 70  
Unsurprisingly, these long and complicated forms delayed compensation, 
and subjected TEPCO to further criticism.71  In response, TEPCO made a 
new 34-page application with 1,005 sections requiring information.72  The 
                                                                                                                                                              
KAKARU SONGAI NI TSUITE (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chousa/kaihatu/016/houk
oku/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/01/18/1315180_1.pdf. 
63
 DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, TOKYO 
DENRYOKU KABUSHIKIGAISHA FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI, DAI-NI GENSHIRYOKU HATSUDENSHO JIKO NI YORU 
GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI NO HAN’I NO HANTEITŌ NI KANSURU CHŪKAN SHISHIN DAINIJI TSUIHO: SEIFU NI 
YORU HINAN KUIKITŌ NO MINAOSHITŌ NI KAKARU SONGAI NI TSUITE (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/anzenkakuho/micro_detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/03
/16/1309711_6.pdf. 
64
 The amounts of temporary compensation are: one million yen per household and 750 thousand 
yen for a single person household. 
65
 Press Release, TEPCO, Permanent Compensation for Nuclear Damages by the Accident at 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (Aug. 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11083007-e.html [hereinafter Permanent 
Compensation Press Release]. 
66
 Tōden Baishō Tetsuzuki Kaishi: 6-man Setai e Seikyū Yōshi Hassō [TEPCO Starts Compensation 
Procedures: Sending out Application Forms to 60,000 Households], THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN  
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/20110912-OYT1T00285.htm. 
67
 Permanent Compensation Press Release, supra note 65. 
68
 Damages that occurred after August 31, 2011 must be claimed on a quarterly basis. 
69
 10% of compensation forms filed / TEPCO’s arduous application process blamed for claimants’ 
slow response, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111012005
321.htm. 
70
 Tepco’s simplified form just 34 pages, 1,005 sections, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20111125a6.html [hereinafter Tepco’s simplified form]. 
71
 See, e.g., 10% of compensation forms filed, supra note 69. 
72
 Tepco’s simplified form, supra note 70. 
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permanent compensation payments for companies and sole proprietors 
started on September 21, 2011.73 
As of January 5, 2012, TEPCO had received approximately 44,000  
application forms from individuals and approximately 18,000 from 
companies and sole proprietors.74  It paid approximately 14.5 billion yen to 
individuals and approximately 126.1 billion yen to companies and sole 
proprietors.75 
C. The Government’s Response 
1. Nuclear Disaster Victims Prompt Relief Law 
The Nuclear Disaster Victims Prompt Relief Law76 was enacted on 
July 29, 2011.  It enables the government to pay a part of the compensation 
to victims, which should be paid by TEPCO, in advance if the permanent 
compensation procedure is delayed.  Currently, small tourist businesses in 
Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Gunma prefectures are able to receive 
compensation for damage to their reputation under this law.77 
2. Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund 
The total amount of damage caused by the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
is estimated to be trillions of yen.78  As stated above, following Section 16 of 
the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Act for Nuclear Damage 
Liability Facilitation Fund79 was enacted on August 3, 2011. 
                                                      
73
 Press Release, TEPCO, Permanent Indemnification for Nuclear Damages to Concerned 
Corporations and Sole Propriators due to the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and 
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (Sep. 21, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-
com/release/11092109-e.html [hereinafter Permanent Indemnification Press Release]. 
74
 RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY, GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI BAISHŌ NI TSUITE [INFORMATION ON THE 
NUCLEAR COMPENSATION SYSTEM] (Jan. 8, 2012), available at http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/%E
8%B3%87%E6%96%99%EF%BC%95%E3%80%80%E5%8E%9F%E5%AD%90%E5%8A%9B%E6%90
%8D%E5%AE%B3%E8%B3%A0%E5%84%9F%E3%81%AB%E3%81%A4%E3%81%84%E3%81%A6
.pdf (distributed at the third session of the Fukushima Reconstruction & Revitalization From Nuclear 
Disaster Council). 
75
 Id. 
76
 Heisei 23 nen Genshiryoku Jiko niyoru Higai ni kakaru Kinkyūsochi ni kansuru Hōritsu [Law 
Relating to Emergency Facilities for the 2011 Nuclear Disaster], Law No. 91 of 2011 (Japan). 
77
 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORTS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, HEISEI 23 NEN 
GENSHIRYOKU JIKO NIYORU HIGAI NI KAKARU KINKYŪSOCHI NI KANSURU HŌRITSU NI MOTODUKU KUNI 
NIYORU KARIBARAI NO JISSHI NI TSUITE, http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/baisho/1311337.htm. 
78
  See, e.g., Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Banri Kaieda, Statement at the Plenary 
Session of the House of Representatives (July 8, 2012) (transcript available at the Record of the 
Proceedings of the Diet, No.31 of the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, the 177 Diet 
Session (July 8, 2012) on page 4). 
79
 Genshiryoku Songai Baishō Shien Kikō Hō [Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund Act], 
Law No. 94 of 2011 (Japan). 
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The purpose of the act is to 1) “take all possible measures for prompt 
and proper nuclear damage compensation for affected people,” 2) to 
“stabilize the conditions of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant and to 
prevent adverse effects on business operators dealing with the accident,” and 
3) “to ensure stable supply of electricity.”80 
Under the Compensation Act, the government established the Nuclear 
Damage Liability Facilitation Fund on September 12, 2011.81  The state 
contributed 7 billion yen, TEPCO contributed 2.4 billion yen, and other 
11 nuclear operators 82  contributed a total of 5.6 billion yen. 83   The 
government issued 2 trillion yen special bonds to support TEPCO through 
the corporation. 84   Later, the amount was increased to 5 trillion yen. 85  
Moreover, under the Act on Emergency Measure for Damage Caused by 
Nuclear Accident,86 the state shall advance the compensation on behalf of 
TEPCO based on the guidelines set by the Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation.87 
D. Dispute Settlement Center for Nuclear Disaster Compensation 
On August 29, 2011, the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for 
Nuclear Damage Compensation opened the Dispute Settlement Center for 
Nuclear Disaster Compensation.88  More than 150 lawyers work for the 
center as mediators and inspectors.89   When a victim of the Fukushima 
                                                      
80
 Id. 
81
 See Summary of Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund, NUCLEAR DAMAGE LIABILITY 
FACILITATION FUND, http://www.ndf.go.jp/soshiki/kikou_gaiyou.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).  
82
 The other operators include Hokkaido Electric Power, Tohoku Electric Power, Hokuriku Electric 
Power, Chubu Electric Power, Kansai Electric Power, Chugoku Electric Power, Shikoku Electric Power, 
Kyushu Electric Power, the Japan Atomic Power Company, J-POWER, and Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited. 
83
 Genshiryoku Baishō Shien Kikō—Tōden wa 24-oku En Shu’shi [Nuclear Damage Liability 
Facilitation Fund: TEPCO Contribute 2.4 Billion Yen], THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Sept. 7, 2011, 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/news/20110906-OYT1T01228.htm. 
84
 MINISTRY OF FINANCE, HEISEI 23 NENDO TOKUBETSU KAIKEI HOSEI YOSAN (DAI 2 GŌ) [2011 
SPECIAL ACCOUNT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET (NO. 2)] 22, http://www.bb.mof.go.jp/server/2011/dlpdf/DL2
01122002.pdf. 
85
 MINISTRY OF FINANCE, HEISEI 23 NENDO TOKUBETSU KAIKEI HOSEI YOSAN (DAI 3 GŌ) [2011 
SPECIAL ACCOUNT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET (NO. 3)] 3, http://www.bb.mof.go.jp/server/2011/dlpdf/DL20
1122003.pdf. 
86
 Law Relating to Emergency Facilities for the 2011 Nuclear Disaster, supra note 76. 
87
 Id. art. 3. 
88
 Genpatsu Funsō Kaiketsu Sentā, Bengoshi 130-nin de Taiō [Dispute Settlement Center for 
Nuclear Damage Compensation: 130 Lawyers Will Handle the Cases], THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN (Aug. 29, 
2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/national/news/20110829-OYT1T00445.htm. 
89
  DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI 
BAISHŌ FUNSŌ KAIKETSU SENTĀ KATSUDŌ JYŌKYŌ HŌKOKUSHŌ [REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION] 3, http://www.mext.go.jp/compon
ent/a_menu/science/anzenkakuho/micro_detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2012/02/16/1316600_1_1_1.pdf. 
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Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant and TEPCO cannot reach an agreement on the 
amount of compensation, the center will assist their mediation without 
charge.90 
E. Nuclear Decontamination Act 
The highest priority issues at the moment are decontamination of the 
affected area and treatment of contaminated waste.  To respond to these 
challenges, the government enacted the Nuclear Decontamination Act91 on 
August 30, 2011.  The act came into full effect on January 1, 2012. 92  
According to the roadmap published by the Ministry of the Environment, the 
Ministry will complete decontamination work by the end of March 2014, 
except for areas with contamination of over fifty millisieverts.93  Under the 
law, the state can claim or reimburse the cost for decontamination and 
treatment of radioactive-contaminated waste from TEPCO.94 
IV. ANALYSIS OF TEPCO’S LIABILITY 
A. The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage Exemption Clause is 
Not Applicable 
The critical issue in assessing TEPCO’s liability is whether the Great 
East Japan Earthquake and tsunami fall under the category of “a grave 
natural disaster of an exceptional character,” as is required by section 3 of 
the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage.95  The Advisory Committee 
on Compensation System for Nuclear Damage of the Atomic Energy 
Commission 96  assumed that “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
                                                      
90
 Id.; See also DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CENTER FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, 
GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI BAISHŌ FUNSŌ KAIKETSU SENTĀ NO TEBIKI [DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CENTER FOR 
NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION GUIDEBOOK], http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/science/anze
nkakuho/micro_detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/12/05/1311548_1_1.pdf. 
91
 Heisei 23-nen 3-gatsu 11-nichi ni Hasseishita Tōhoku Chihō Taiheiyōoki Jishin ni tomonau 
Genshiryoku Hatsudensho no Jiko ni yori Hōshutsusareta Hōshasei Busshitsu ni yoru Kankyō no Osen e no 
Taisho ni kansuru Tokubetsu Sochihō, Law No. 110 of 2011 (Japan) [hereinafter Nuclear Decontamination 
Act].  
92
 Id. at supplementary provision 1. 
93
 THE MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, POLICY ON DECONTAMINATION IN THE SPECIAL AREAS FOR 
DECONTAMINATION (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.env.go.jp/press/file_view.php?serial=19091&how_id=147
47. 
94
 Nuclear Decontamination Act, supra note 91, art. 44. 
95
 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE OF THE ATOMIC 
ENERGY COMMISSION, DRAFT REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR 
NUCLEAR DAMAGE (Oct. 8, 1998), http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/senmon/old/songai/sonota/sonota01/siryo
1.htm#5. 
96
 The Atomic Energy Commission was set up under the Cabinet based on the Atomic Energy Basic 
Law in 1956.  Genshiryoku Kihon Hō [Atomic Energy Basic Law], Law No. 186 of 1955 (Japan), 
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character” was a great earthquake, volcanic eruption, wind and water 
disaster, or other type of natural disaster on a scale that generally had not 
been seen in history.97  Moreover, the Advisory Committee explained that 
this exemption is limited to an event of force majeure of an extraordinarily 
high degree; for example, the Great Kanto Earthquake and the Great 
Hanshin Earthquake do not fall under this exemption.98   An earthquake 
falling within this exemption should be one that has never been seen in 
history, and substantially greater than these great earthquakes.99  The Atomic 
Energy Commission assumes that “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional 
character” will be an unforeseeable, great natural disaster based on current 
knowledge, and must be far beyond the design basis for a reactor.100  During 
the Diet deliberations on the Compensation Act, Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone, 
then Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency, explained “a 
grave natural disaster of an exceptional character” meant a great earthquake 
more than “triple” the Great Kanto Earthquake.101  It is not clear whether he 
meant tripled intensity, tripled magnitude, or tripled acceleration, but the 
members of the Advisory Committee on Compensation System for Nuclear 
Damage assumed that he meant tripled acceleration.102  Regarding the Great 
Kanto Earthquake of 1923, its maximum seismic intensity was seven, its 
magnitude was 7.9, and its assumed peak ground acceleration was 300-400 
Gal.103  Table 1 shows each peak ground acceleration at the Fukushima Dai-
ichi Nuclear Power Plant when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred.104 
                                                                                                                                                              
translation available at http://www.nsc.go.jp/NSCenglish/documents/laws/1.pdf.  The purpose of this 
commission is to carry out planned national policies on the research, development, and use of nuclear 
energy, and to facilitate the democratic operation of nuclear energy administration.  Id. art. 4.  The Atomic 
Energy Commission plans, deliberates on, and determines the matters related to the research, development 
and utilization of nuclear energy.  Id. art. 5, para. 1.  While the Nuclear Safety Commission has the same 
purposes as the Atomic Energy Commission, as is seen in art. 4, it plans, deliberates on and determines 
matters related to ensuring safety among the matters related to the research, development, and utilization of 
nuclear energy.  Id. art. 5 para. 2. 
97
 DRAFT REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 95. 
98
 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE OF THE ATOMIC 
ENERGY COMMISSION, COMMENTS AND ANSWERS ON THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE (1998), http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/sir
yo98/siryo70/siryo13.htm. 
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Record of the Proceedings of the Diet, No. 13 of the Special Committee on Science and 
Technology Promosion of the House of Representatives, the 34th Diet Session (May 18, 1960). 
102
 JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, DRAFT MINUTES OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 
(1998), http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/senmon/old/songai/siryo/siryo04/siryo1.htm. 
103
 Historic Earthquakes: Kanto (Kwanto), Japan, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1923_09_01.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
104
 This data was provided by TEPCO on April 1, 2011.  Press Release, Nuclear and Industry Safety 
Agency of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Record of Earthquake Observation of the 
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TABLE 1: PEAK GROUND ACCELERATION AND DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE 
GROUND MOTION IN THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
Observation 
Point 
Record of Observation 
(provisional value as of  
April 1, 2011) 
Design Basis Earthquake 
Ground Motion (Gal) 
Peak Ground Acceleration 
(Gal) 
north-
south 
east-
west 
vertical north-
south 
east-
west 
vertical 
Unit 1 460* 447* 258* 487 489 412 
Unit 2 348* 550* 302* 441 438 420 
Unit 3 322* 507* 231* 449 441 429 
Unit 4 281* 319* 200* 447 445 422 
Unit 5 331* 548* 256* 452 452 427 
Unit 6 298* 444* 244  445 448 415 
*The record ended approximately 130-150 seconds after the record started. 
After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the reactors of units one to 
three of the Dai-ichi Plant were automatically shut down.105  Units four to 
six were under periodic maintenance at that time.106  Due to the earthquake, 
the power grid around it was so damaged that the plant lost its external 
power source, and the emergency generators in the reactor basements started 
up.107   Approximately fifty minutes after the Earthquake, the plant was 
flooded by a tsunami.108  This caused the emergency generators to break 
down, and the entire plant lost power.109  The height of  the tsunami wave at 
the plant could have been as high as 13.1 meters based on computer 
analysis.110  While the design basis for tsunami waves was 5.7 meters for the 
Dai-ichi Plant and 5.2 meters for the Dai-ni Plant, TEPCO predicted in 2008 
                                                                                                                                                              
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant and the Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Plant for the Great East 
Japan Earthquake (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/04/20110401013/2011040
1013.pdf. 
105
 NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE HEADQUARTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, REPORT OF 
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE IAEA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY: THE 
ACCIDENT AT TEPCO’S FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS (June 2011) IV-33, available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/iaea_houkokusho_e.html. 
106
 Id. at IV-30-31. 
107
 Id. at IV-33. 
108
 Id. at III-28-32. 
109
 Id. 
110
 TEPCO, REPORT ON INVESTIGATION RESULTS REGARDING TSUNAMI GENERATED BY THE 
TOHOKU-TAIHEIYOU-OKI-EARTHQUAKE IN FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI AND DAINI NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS 
(2011), available at http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11040910-e.html.  
JUNE 2012 LIABILITY FOR THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER 447 
that a tsunami wave over fifteen meters would occur if an 8.3 magnitudes 
earthquake—the same magnitude as the Meiji Sanriku Earthquake of 1896—
occurred off the coast of Fukushima.111  However, TEPCO did not use this 
finding when creating the plant’s earthquake countermeasures.112  TEPCO 
simply reported the finding to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency at 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (“METI”) on March 7, 2011, 
four days before the Great East Japan Earthquake.113  Thus, the Great East 
Japan Earthquake and tsunami do not fit into “a grave natural disaster of an 
exceptional character,” because neither of them were unforeseeable nor far 
beyond the design basis for reactors. 
B. Other Legal Issues 
1. Jurisdiction 
There are no provisions on jurisdiction under the Act on 
Compensation for Nuclear Damage.  Following the general rule, an action is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the court that has jurisdiction over the location 
of general venue of the defendant.114   TEPCO is a corporation, and its 
principle office is located in Tokyo, 115  so the Tokyo District Court has 
jurisdiction over the lawsuits related to the Fukushima nuclear disaster.116 
Otherwise, victims can bring lawsuits in the court that has jurisdiction over 
their domicile.117  Regarding tort claims, a court has jurisdiction over the 
place where the tort at issue occurred.118  
Japan has not ratified any treaties dealing with nuclear damage.119  
Therefore, people in other countries may bring their lawsuits in the country 
                                                      
111
 TEPCO Knew Waters Could Reach 15 Meters, THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN, (Aug. 27, 2011), 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110826005191.htm. 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. 
114
 MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. CIV. PRO.], art. 4, item 1. 
115
 See id. art. 4, para. 4.  
116
 If the amount in controversy is less than 1.4 million yen, the summary court generally has 
jurisdiction.  Saibansho Hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 33 para. 1, item 1 (Japan).  
117
 MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. CIV. PRO.], art. 5, item 1 (Japan);  MINPŌ [Civ. C.] art. 484.  If 
citizens outside of Japan suffer from nuclear damage during their stay in Japan, they must follow the Act on 
General Rules for Application of Laws.  Hō no Tekiyō ni Kansuru Tsūsoku Hō [Act on General Rules for 
Application of Laws], Law No. 78 of 2006 (Japan).  Section 17 provides that the formation and effect of a 
claim arising from a tort shall be governed by the law of the place where the result of the wrongful act 
occurred.  Id. at sec. 17.  However, if the occurrence at said place was ordinarily unforeseeable, the law of 
place where the wrongful act was committed shall govern.  Id. 
118
 MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] [C. CIV. PRO.], art. 5, item 9. 
119
 Such treaties are the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Convention on Supplementary 
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where the defendant is located (Japan), where the nuclear accident occurs 
(Japan), or where they are injured (their countries). 
2. Causation 
The Nuclear Damage Compensation Dispute Reconciliation 
Committee stated that persons injured while engaging in recovery work 
following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, suffer health deterioration 
requiring treatment, contract a disease, or die, he or she may be compensated 
for damage caused by acute or late radiation.120  Nonetheless, such persons 
must still prove a causal link between their damages and the radioactive 
substances released from the plant.  
In Japan, cause-in-fact has been determined by the so-called “but for” 
test.121  The civil standard of proof of causation is “not a scientific standard 
that leaves no doubt, but a case of ‘strong probability’ that a specific event 
caused a specific loss by considering all the evidence based on the rules of 
thumb.” 122   Strong probability under the test can be found when “a 
reasonable person is convinced of the conclusion to the extent s/he has no 
doubt.”123  In the Sumitomo Metal Mining Co., Ltd. case, parties disputed 
whether plaintiffs’ health damages were caused by the JCO Criticality 
Accident.124  The Tokyo District Court and the Tokyo High Court found that 
the plaintiffs who worked at a factory that was well over 100 meters from 
the JCO Plant were exposed to 6.5 mSv of radiation, but denied the causal 
link between the exposure and their damages.125  
In other cases related to JCO Criticality Accident, courts admitted that 
“nuclear damage” under section 2 of the Act on Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage included reputation damage 126  or pure economic damage. 127  
                                                                                                                                                              
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (still pending).  The United States has ratified only the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 
120
 See DISPUTE RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION, TOKYO 
DENRYOKU KABUSHIKIGAISHA FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI, DAI-NI GENSHIRYOKU HATSUDENSHO JIKO NI YORU 
GENSHIRYOKU SONGAI NO HANI NO HANTEITŌ NI KANSURU CHŪKAN SHISHIN. 
121
 See, e.g., KAZUO SHINOMIYA, FUHŌKŌI—JIMUKANRI, FUTŌRITOKU, FUHŌKŌI CHU-GE-KAN 411 
(1987).  
122
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Oct. 24, 1975, Sho. 48(o) no. 517, 29 SIAKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1417 (Japan) (commonly known as the Lumbar Case). 
123
 Id. at 1420.  
124
 Supra note 19. 
125
 Id. 
126
 See Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.], Feb. 27, 2006, Hei 15 (wa) no. 4306, 1204 HANREI 
TAIMUZU [HANTA] 116 (Japan) (commonly known as Takanofoods Co., Ltd. v. JCO); Tōkyō Chihō 
Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.], Apr. 19, 2006, Hei 14 (wa) no. 6644, 1960 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 64 (Japan) 
(commonly known as Kume Quality Products v. JCO).  In both of these cases, the court gave an award to 
the plaintiffs.  
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However, each court denied the plaintiffs’ claims because any decline in 
sales or decrease in property value was not caused by the accident. 
3. Statute of Limitations 
Again, because there are no provisions on the statute of limitations 
under the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Civil Code and its 
interpretation apply to this issue.128  For tort claims, plaintiffs must bring 
their case into court within three years of the time when they come to know 
of their damage and the identity of the tortfeasor.129  A victim’s tort claim is 
automatically precluded after twenty years have elapsed from the time when 
the tort committed.130  However, courts have amended this twenty–year rule 
for toxic tort cases.  When a victim’s injury has an accumulative and latent 
nature, courts set the starting point of the period of prescription on the date 
when he or she develops his or her injury.131  Radiation exposure will be 
treated in a similar way. 
V. WHO ELSE SHOULD BE LEGALLY LIABLE FOR THE FUKUSHIMA 
NUCLEAR DISASTER? 
A. Potential Liability of the Government of Japan 
Sovereign immunity is not accepted under Article 14 of the 
Constitution of Japan.  Under the State Compensation Law,132 when  public 
officials who are in a position to exercise public power have, in the course of 
performing their duties, illegally inflicted losses on another person 
intentionally or negligently, the state or a public entity is liable for 
compensating such losses.133  The Supreme Court has recognized that when 
                                                                                                                                                              
127
 See Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.], Sept. 27, 2004, Hei 14 (wa) no. 19606, 1876 
HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 34 (Japan) (commonly known as Ibaraki Kotsu Co., Ltd. v. JCO); Tōkyō Kōtō 
Saibansho [Tōkyō High Ct.], Sept. 21, 2005, Hei 16 (ne) no. 5435, 1914 HANREI JIHŌ [HANJI] 95 (Japan).  
Both courts denied the plaintiffs’ claims because the decrease in property value was not caused by the JCO 
Criticality Accident. 
128
 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, FAQ ON THE NUCLEAR DAMAGE COMPENSATION SCHEME, 
http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/faq/1261362.htm (question eight explains how nuclear 
damage compensation claims are processed). 
129
 MINPŌ [CIV. C.] art. 724 (Japan). 
130
 Id. 
131
 See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Apr. 27, 2004, Hei 13 (uke) no. 1760, 58(4) SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1032 (Japan) (commonly known as the Chikuhō Pneumoconisis 
Case). 
132
 Kokka Baishō Hō [State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947 (Japan), translation available at 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&yo=&x=16&y=25&kn[]=%E3%81%93&re=01
&ky=&page=13. 
133
 Id. art. 1, para. 1. 
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human life and health are in danger and the government does not exercise its 
regulatory power over the cause of danger, the government is liable under 
State Compensation Law.134  So far, there is no case law that addresses the 
issue whether the State Compensation Law is applicable to nuclear damage.  
Regarding the Fukushima nuclear disaster, there are several facts that 
suggest potential liability of the Japanese government.  First of all, the 
government should have properly exercised its power over nuclear operation 
generally.  The Nuclear Safety Commission (“NSC”) deals with planning, 
deliberation, and making decisions on regulations and policies related to 
nuclear safety and prevention of radiation hazards.135  However, the NSC has 
disregarded a long-time station blackout.136  The NSC first disclosed this 
document on July 13, 2011, eighteen years after it was made.137  
Second, the government should have properly exercised its power 
over the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant.  Before this disaster, the 
Plant had experienced several incidents, and two of these are exceptionally 
notable.  One was the nation’s first criticality incident (equivalent INES 
level two) on November 2, 1978, which was covered up for twenty-nine 
years.138  The other was an incident involving a recalculating pump (INES 
level two) on September 9, 1990.139  In light of this accident history, the 
government should have supervised TEPCO more strictly.  
Third, there may be an opportunity to argue that nuclear damage was 
increased by errant acts of the government.  In regard to this argument, the 
interim report published by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at 
                                                      
134
 See Chikuhō Pneumoconisis Case, supra note 131; Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.], Oct. 25, 2004,  
Hei 13 (o) no. 1196, 58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1802 (Japan) (commonly known as  
the Kansai Minamatabyō Case); see also Eri Osaka, Environmental and Worker Safety Law in Japan: 
Recent Changes, the Impact of Reform Laws and Movements, and the Prospects for the Future (Sho Sato 
Conference, Working Paper, 2001). 
135
 NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION OF JAPAN, THE BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEAR-TERM INITIATIVES 
OF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.nsc.go.jp/NSCenglish/pdf/101202.pdf. 
136
 WORKING GROUP ON STATION BLACKOUT OF THE STUDY GROUP OF ANALYTICAL ESTIMATION ON 
ACCIDENT AND TROUBLE OF NUCLEAR FACILITY, THE STATION BLACKOUT ON THE NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT (1993).  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission took the problem more seriously.  It 
commissioned research on station blackout with Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the early 1980s.  The 
study group simulated the response of Mark I to station blackout, and predicted that core meltdown and a 
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the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations140 suggests that the government was 
incompetent to respond the nuclear emergency:   
the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters . . . and the 
Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters . . . include 
the fact that the Off-site Center, which was supposed to serve as 
the base for response during the nuclear emergency, lost its 
functionality, and the fact that coordination among relevant 
organizations was inadequate.141 
It also suggests that the government failed to prevent expansion of the 
disaster:  
These problems include: radiation monitoring systems and the 
System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose 
Information (SPEEDI) did not work as they were designed and 
expected to do; the scale of the disaster that occurred had not 
been considered when preparing evacuation plans and 
evacuation drills; there was confusion at the accident site 
regarding the Government’s evacuation directives; and not 
enough information was provided in Japan and abroad in a 
rapid, accurate, easy-to-understand manner.142 
B. GE’s Potential Liability  
1. Reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant is located in Okuma Town 
and Futaba Town, Futaba County, Fukushima Prefecture, facing the Pacific 
Ocean on the east side.143  The Plant consists of six units with light water, 
boiling water reactors.144  Units one to five were built with Mark I type 
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containment structures, 145  while unit six was built with a Mark II type 
containment structure (Table 2).146  The reactors for units one, two, and six 
were built by GE, while the reactors for units three and five were built by 
Toshiba Corp., and the reactor for unit four was built by Hitachi Ltd.147  The 
reactors were all designed by GE.148  In fact, the reactor for unit one was the 
first commercial reactor in Japan that was built as a “full turnkey project” by 
GE.149  This means that GE designed and built it and turned it over to 
TEPCO in a ready-to-use condition.  At unit one, the emergency diesel 
generators and DC batteries were located at the basement of the turbine 
building (Figure 1).150  GE required placement in that location.  Unit two 
was built in the same way.151  Later, Toshiba became the main contractor for 
units three and five, and Hitachi Ltd. became the main contractor for unit 
four.152  Both companies followed the basic GE plant design.153 
TABLE 2: GENERAL DATA OF SIX REACTORS OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT154 
 UNIT 1 UNIT 2 UNIT 3 UNIT 4 UNIT 5 UNIT 6 
Reactor Type Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark I Mark II 
Domestic Content 56% 53% 91% 91% 93% 63% 
Designer GE GE GE GE GE GE 
Main Contractor GE GE & 
Toshiba 
Toshiba Hitachi Toshiba GE & 
Toshiba 
Construction 
Began 
Sept. 
1967 
May 
1969 
Oct. 
1970 
Sep. 
1972 
Dec. 
1971 
May 
1973 
Commercial 
Operation Began 
Mar. 
1971 
July 
1974 
Mar. 
1976 
Oct. 
1978 
Apr. 
1978 
Oct. 
1979 
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FIGURE 1: CROSS SECTION OF UNIT 1 OF THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT155 
 
Since the disaster, GE has emphasized “[the] Mark I containment has 
a proven track record of safety and reliability for over 40 years.” 156  
However, there have been doubts over the Mark I’s safety.  In 1972, Stephen 
H. Hanauer, then a safety official with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 
recommended that Mark I be discontinued because it presented unacceptable 
safety risks.157  Moreover, three GE nuclear engineers resigned from their 
jobs in 1976, because they strongly believed that a design flaw in the Mark I 
could trigger a disaster. 158   Dale G. Bridenbaugh, one of the three GE 
employees who resigned, commented that the Mark I design “did not take 
into account the dynamic loads that could be experienced with a loss of 
coolant,”159 and “[the] impact loads the containment would receive by this 
very rapid release of energy could tear the containment apart and create an 
uncontrolled release.”160 
2. Possibility of U.S. Product Liability Lawsuit Against GE 
As mentioned above, the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 
channels legal liability to nuclear operators and precludes the claims under 
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the Product Liability Law or the Civil Code.161  Therefore, there is no way to 
pursue GE’s liability in Japan.  However, the principle office of GE is 
located in Connecticut.162  A Fukushima nuclear disaster victim, such as a 
person exposed to radiation released from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear 
Power Plant, might think of bringing a lawsuit against GE in Connecticut 
state court or in a federal court of the United States.163 
Regarding the “channeling” issue, the Price-Anderson Act does not 
adopt legal channeling but economic channeling, which means a nuclear 
operator must compensate nuclear damage even other persons may be held 
legally liable for it.164  Moreover, the Price-Anderson Act is not applicable to 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster after all, because this nuclear accident 
occurred at a facility operated by non-U.S. companies outside the United 
States. 
3. Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine 
The United States federal court has applied forum non conveniens 
doctrine to refuse to hear a case even if it has jurisdiction when the court 
chosen by the plaintiff is inconvenient for the parties and justice would be 
better served if the case is brought in another court.165   
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, the United States Supreme Court offered 
three key considerations whether a court should grant a defendant’s motion 
of forum non conveniens:  1) availability of foreign forum, 2) private interest, 
and 3) public interest.166  Regarding private interest, the factors to consider 
are the relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory 
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance 
of willing witnesses, possibility of view of the premises if appropriate, and 
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and 
inexpensive. 167   Regarding public interest, the factors to be considered 
include the undesirability of piling up litigation in congested centers, the 
                                                      
161
 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2, art. 4, para. 3 (Japan); the JCO Critical 
Accident Health Injury Case, supra note 19. 
162
 GE Fact Sheet, GENERAL ELECTRIC, http://www.ge.com/company/factsheets/corporate.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
163
 U.S. federal courts also have jurisdiction over the citizens of foreign States, including Japan, and 
diversity jurisdiction over United States citizens.  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  While the Judiciary Act of 1789 
gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien tort victim, it appears to be 
difficult to argue that GE’s actions are part of a tort that violates international law or any treaty to which the 
United States is a party.  Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
164
 The Price-Anderson Act § 2210(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1957). 
165
 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
166
 Id. 
167
 Id. at 502, 508. 
JUNE 2012 LIABILITY FOR THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER 455 
burden of jury duty on people of a community having no relation to the 
litigation, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at 
home, and the unnecessary injection of problems in conflict of laws.168  
Though some jurisdictions limit the availability of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine, the Connecticut state courts preserve it.169  In Durkin v. 
Intevac, Inc., the Connecticut Supreme Court cited Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 
and then continued:  
First, the court should determine whether an adequate 
alternative forum exists that possesses jurisdiction over the 
whole case.  Second, the court should consider all relevant 
private interest factors with a strong presumption in favor of—
or, in the present case, a weakened presumption against 
disturbing the plaintiffs' initial choice of forum.  Third, if the 
balance of private interest factors is equal, the court should 
consider whether any public interest factors tip the balance in 
favor of trying the case in the foreign forum.  Finally, if the 
public interest factors tip the balance in favor of trying the case 
in the foreign forum, “the court must ensure that [the] plaintiffs 
can reinstate their [action] in the alternative forum without 
undue inconvenience or prejudice.”170   
Regarding the availability or adequacy of an alternative forum, if a 
victim in Japan sues GE in any court in Japan, Japanese law will be applied 
under the Act on General Rules for Application of Laws. 171   This act 
provides that the formation and effect of a claim arising from a tort shall be 
governed by the law of the place where the result of the wrongful act 
occurred.172  In such a case, claims against GE would be precluded under the 
Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. 173   In addition, because the 
alleged flaws are in the design of Mark I, it may be said that substantial 
evidence is located at the GE headquarters or other offices in the United 
States rather than in GE Japan174 and that many witnesses including current 
or former GE workers are available in the United States rather than in Japan.  
Therefore, it is clear neither the federal courts, nor the Connecticut state 
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courts, will apply the forum non conveniens doctrine in the lawsuit against 
GE. 
4. Conflict of Laws 
The law that should be applied to a potential case against GE poses 
another critical issue for the victims in Japan.  If a court applies Japanese 
laws, the claims against GE are precluded under the Act on Compensation 
for Nuclear Damage.175  
Connecticut follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in 
tort cases.176  Under the Restatement, the rights and liabilities of the parties 
in tort cases are determined by the local law of the state which has the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.177  The factors to be 
taken into account include:  1) the place where the injury occurred, 2) the 
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, 3) the domicile, 
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and business of the parties; and 
4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.178  
In addition, the court must consider other factors including:  5) the needs of 
the interstate and international systems, 6) the relevant policies of the forum; 
7) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the determination of the particular issue, 8) the protection of 
justified expectations, 9) the basic policies underlying the particular field of 
law, 10) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 11) ease in the 
determination and application of the law to be applied.179 
Given these factors, there is a substantial likelihood that a Connecticut 
state court will apply Japanese laws.  Nonetheless, on the assumption that 
the court would apply Connecticut law, what would be the result? 
5. Design Defect Claim Under Connecticut Law 
Connecticut passed the Product Liability Act in 1979. 180   In 
Connecticut, a “product liability” claim includes “all claims or actions 
brought for personal injury, death or property damage caused by the 
manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, 
                                                      
175
 See Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, supra note 2, art. 4, para. 1. 
176
 Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010:  Twenty-Fourth Annual 
Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 330 (2011).  
177
 The Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws § 145(1). 
178
 Id. § 145(2).  
179
 Id. § 6. 
180
 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m et seq. 
JUNE 2012 LIABILITY FOR THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER 457 
installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing, packaging, or 
labeling of any product.”181  
The units designed by GE have been modified by TEPCO since their 
installation.  Nonetheless, GE could be found liable not for the harm that 
would have occurred, but for the fact that the reactor was modified if such 
modification was 1) in accordance with the instructions or specifications of 
GE, 2) made with the consent of GE, or 3) the result of conduct that 
reasonably should have been anticipated by GE.182  
In Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., the Connecticut Supreme 
Court introduced a modified consumer expectation test, admitting that a risk-
utility balancing must be utilized in order to decide whether a design is 
defective.183  The factors to be considered include:  1) usefulness of the 
product, 2) likelihood and severity of danger caused by the product, 3) 
feasibility of an alternative design, 4) financial cost of improved design, 5) 
ability to reduce danger without impairing its usefulness or making the 
product too costly, and 6) feasibility of spreading loss by increasing the 
product’s price.184  Plaintiffs are not required to prove a feasible alternative 
design, because such a requirement places an “undue burden on [the 
plaintiff] that might preclude otherwise valid claims from jury 
consideration.”185  
Under the Connecticut Product Liability Act, persons wanting to 
recover damages for personal injury or property damage caused by radiation 
exposure resulting from the Fukushima nuclear disaster must bring a claim 
within two years from the date the injury or damage complained of is 
discovered. 186   Regarding the other damages not caused by radiation 
exposure, a claim must be brought within three years from the date of injury, 
death, or property damage was first sustained.187  There is also a restriction 
requiring that a product liability claim must be brought against any party 
within ten years from the date that the party last parted with possession or 
control of the product.188   However, this ten-year limitation is extended 
pursuant to the terms of any express written warranty that the product can be 
used for a period longer than ten years.189  Moreover, this limitation will not 
be applied when a product seller, including a person who designs or 
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constructs a product intentionally misrepresents the product or fraudulently 
conceals information about it, if the misrepresentation or fraudulent 
concealment was the proximate cause of harm of the claimant.190  
There are some disincentives for plaintiffs in product liability cases in 
a Connecticut court.  First, if a court determines that a claim is frivolous, it 
may award reasonable attorney's fees to the defendants.191   Second, the 
amount of punitive damages cannot exceed an amount equal to twice the 
damages awarded to plaintiffs.192 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article summarizes the related laws and compensation scheme for 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster and discussed the liability issues for TEPCO, 
the government of Japan, and GE.  
Thus far, only a handful of lawsuits have emerged from the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster.  These lawsuits include:  1) damage suits 
against TEPCO,193 2) provisional injunction lawsuits requiring TEPCO to 
pay provisional payments, 194  3) criminal complaints against the former 
CEOs of TEPCO and other decisionmakers including former Prime Minister 
Kan,195 4) a provisional injunction lawsuit requiring a local government to 
move children to a safe place,196 and 5) state compensation lawsuits filed by 
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a shareholder of TEPCO.197  In addition, the shareholders of TEPCO brought 
lawsuits against the current and former CEOs.198  Though no lawsuit has 
been brought against GE to date, it may be too early for GE to rest easy.  At 
least one commentator has pointed out that GE may agree to take financial 
responsibility for the disaster, as did British Petroleum, even if it could 
escape liability.199  There is a long road ahead. 
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